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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEFF KOFOED, 
Applicant/Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS and WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Defendant. 
Case No. 93-0201 CA 
Priority No. 7 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
I. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter under Utah 
Code Annotated, § 35-1-82.53 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988) and 78-2a-
3(2)(a) (1988). 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the Legislature intend to confer upon inmates of penal 
institutions the status of "employee" as it pertains to coverage 
under the Workers Compensation Act. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
These proceedings were commenced after January 1, 1988. 
Therefore, review of this case is appropriate under the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann. 
SS 63-46b-l et sea. Because the applicable statute grants 
discretion to the Industrial Commission in the interpretation and 
application of the statutory language at issue, the Commission's 
determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). 
IV. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-16. 
2. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-24. 
3. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-43. 
4. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45. 
5. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53. 
6. Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). 
7. Utah Code Annotated, Section 64-13-6. 
8. Utah Code Annotated, Section 64-13-16. 
9. Utah Code Annotated, Section 64-13-19. 
10. Utah Code Annotated, Section 64-13a-2. 
11. Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
12. Utah Attorney General's Opinion, No. 79-90. 
V. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This petition is an appeal from a decision by the Industrial 
Commission determining that inmates employed at the Utah State 
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Prison in various work programs, under Section 64-13-16, U.C.A., 
are not employees entitled to benefits under the Workers 
Compensation Act of this state. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Petitioner filed a claim for benefits under the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act claiming he was an employee at the time of his 
accident in 1986. Following a hearing to determine the threshold 
question of employee status, the administrative law judge 
determined the petitioner was an employee. On motion for review, 
the Industrial Commission reversed this decision holding 
petitioner was not an employee. A petition was then filed for 
review by this court. 
C. Statement of Facts.1 
The petitioner did not request a transcript of the hearing 
of this matter, but elected instead to rely upon the Findings of 
Fact entered by the Administrative Law Judge. Although there is 
little controversy as to the facts of this case, most of the 
facts enumerated by the Petitioner in his Brief are irrelevant to 
the issue presented for review. Furthermore, the Industrial 
Commission in its Grant of Motion for Review, dated February 26, 
1
 Taken verbatim from the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact and the 
Industrial Commission's Grant of Motion for Review, but excluding therefrom those facts 
which are irrelevant to the sole issue presented in this case. (R. 18-25, 47-53) Because the 
hearing before the Commission's Administrative Law Judge was limited to the single issue of 
determining claimant's employee status, individual "facts" as found by the A U are still 
subject to dispute by Defendants and are provided only as general background information. 
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1993, specifically stated "the findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and order of the ALJ are therefore reversed, and we 
substitute our findings, conclusions and order." (R. p.53) This 
is consistent with well-established case law that indicates the 
Commission is the ultimate finder of fact, even though in this 
case, it probably makes little difference, because the relevant 
facts are not in dispute. 
1. Applicant herein, Jeff Kofoed, was and is an inmate of 
the Utah State Prison. On or about July 20, 1986, he became a 
fire fighter at the Utah State Prison. The applicant was allowed 
to volunteer and as an inmate sign up for the Conservation Camp 
at the Utah State Prison based on his conduct. The purpose of 
the Conservation Camp was to perform conservation and fire 
suppression activities, both in the state of Utah and throughout 
the West. The program, which the applicant was involved in, was 
a joint program between the Department of Corrections and the 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, according to the testimony 
of the deputy warden. That program consists of the Lone Peak 
State Nursery and the Conservation Camp, which are located at the 
prison. The Conservation Camp program was not housed with the 
regular prison population, but rather, was housed at the Lone 
Peak facility. 
2. As part of the Conservation Camp Residents Agreement, 
the applicant agreed that he would remain in the program for a 
minimum of one year. The Agreement [See Addendum p. 43] also 
noted that the applicant's "Participation in the Conservation 
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Camp is purely voluntary." In addition, the Agreement required 
that applicant satisfactorily complete the "Fire Fighting 
training program and Advanced First Aid by the American Red 
Cross, and other training as needed or assigned." As a result, 
the applicant received his training, and fought approximately 30 
fires during the summer of 1986. In late August of 1986, the 
applicant had been fighting fires in Oregon, when he was assigned 
to a fire in Idaho. 
3. On August 25, 1986, the applicant was traveling in a 
van to the scene of a fire on public land in Idaho. As he was 
traveling in the van, the van went off a cliff [actually off the 
road into rough terrain]. The applicant sustained injuries to 
his low back. The Applicant was given pain medication, and was 
hospitalized for three days. He was then returned to the Utah 
State Prison. 
4. Between 1987 and 1990, the applicant was paroled a 
total of approximately 18 months. 
5. In January of 1990, the applicant returned to the fire 
fighting program and stayed in that program until November 1990, 
when he was again paroled. 
6. In June 1991, the applicant was returned to the Utah 
State Prison because of a revoked parole. Shortly thereafter, 
the applicant was paroled on March 10, 1992. In June 1992, the 
applicant was returned to Utah State Prison for failing a drug 
screening test. 
7. The Deputy Warden testified that the Division of State 
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Lands and Forestry invoices the fire fighting inmate services at 
$6.00 - $6.50 per hour. He testified that the Utah State prison, 
however, only received the cost of the inmate wage [stipend] of 
$3.50 per hour and the Division of State Lands and Forestry 
pockets the remainder. The Division of State Lands and Forestry 
also provides the equipment that the inmates need in addition to 
the wage. The prison1s Director of Support Services [Mr. 
Leatham] testified that there is no withholding from the funds 
paid to the prisoners, because the prison has concluded that 
those payments are a "Stipend," and are not "Wages" since the 
prison had no intent to pay wages. However, Mr. Leatham did 
indicate that the prison does pay workers compensation premiums 
on some of its Utah Correctional Industries employees because of 
federal law requirements. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Convicts and prisoners working in prison sponsored 
rehabilitation programs are not employees in the ordinary sense 
as that term is used in Section 35-1-43, U.C.A. Injuries 
sustained by such individuals in prison sponsored rehabilitation 
programs are not covered under the Workers Compensation Act. 
This has been the long standing policy of the Department of 
Corrections. The policy has been consistently upheld by the 
Industrial Commission and that policy has now been clarified by 
statute in both the Workers Compensation Act, Section 43, and the 
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legislation pertaining to inmate employment in Sections 64-13-16 
and 64-13-19. These changes are a clarification of the law, not 
a change in the law. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REVIEW FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IS THE PROPER STANDARD 
OF REVIEW UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i). 
This Court considered standards of review for agency action 
extensively in King v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 850 P.2d 
1281 (Utah App. 1993). The King case establishes the analytical 
model to be applied in review of agency action. As noted by the 
Court, "This model applies in all UAPA cases dealing with either 
the interpretation or application of agency-specific law by an 
agency. First, we determine whether the legislature explicitly 
granted discretion to the agency to interpret or apply statutory 
language at issue." King, 850 P.2d at 1291. If such a grant is 
found, review is appropriate under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-(4)(h)(i) for abuse of discretion, giving some 
discretion to the agency and determining "whether its action is 
within the bounds of reasonableness." Id. If no explicit grant 
of discretion is found, the King model requires an examination of 
the statute and its context for an implicit grant. An implicit 
grant of discretion, like an explicit grant, triggers review 
under subsection (4)(h)(i) for reasonableness and abuse of 
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discretion. Only if no grant of discretion is found and the 
language is unambiguous and susceptible to construction through 
traditional interpretive methods does the Court review for 
correction of error. 
It is clear from the commission's Grant of Motion for Review 
(R. 47-53) that it was acting under the powers and duties 
explicitly conferred upon it by Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-16(1) and 
35-1-24 (1988). Section 35-1-16(1) explicitly grants the 
Commission "full power, jurisdiction, and authority to: . . . (d) 
investigate, ascertain, and determine reasonable classifications 
of persons, employments, and places of employment as necessary to 
carry out the purposes of this title . . . . " Determinihg 
whether inmates performing labor for non-market wages are 
employees for purposes of workers1 compensation is precisely the 
kind of reasonable classification of persons and employments that 
the statute explicitly commits to the Commissions particularized 
expertise. Therefore, the Commission's determination is to be 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, giving some 
deference to the agency1s interpretation and assessing whether 
its determination is within the bounds of reasonableness. 
Even if there was no explicit grant of discretion, the 
breadth of the statutory definition of "employee" is subject to 
more than one interpretation. Under King, "[i]f the statutory 
language is broad and expansive or subject to numerous 
interpretations we will assume the legislature has chosen to 
defer the policy making expertise of the agency and review the 
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action under section 63-46b-16(h)(i) for abuse of discretion." 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(1)(b) (Supp. 1993) defines "employee" as 
follows: 
each person in the service of any employer, as defined 
in Section 35-1-42, who employs one or more workers or 
operatives regularly in the same business, or in or 
about the same establishment, under any contract of 
hire, express or implied, oral or written, including 
aliens and minors, whether legally or illegally working 
for hire, but not including any person whose employment 
is casual and not in the usual course of the trade, 
business, or occupation of his employer. 
This broad and expansive definition contains many factors that 
are subject to multiple interpretations; in fact, hearings before 
the Commission routinely involve the construction and application 
of such terms as "regularly", "contract of hire", "casual 
employment", and "usual course of business" to the determination 
of employee status for the purpose of receiving statutory 
benefits. These determinations depend on the factual specifics 
of the alleged employment relationship and cannot be resolved 
outside the relevant factual context. The necessity for 
individual consideration of employment status in fact-specific 
contexts strongly points to an implicit grant of discretion to 
the agency to interpret and apply statutory language, including 
the definition of "employee" for purposes of workers' 
compensation coverage. Because implicit, like explicit, grants 
of discretion trigger subsection (4)(h)(i) review, the 
reasonableness/abuse of discretion standard applied here. 
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POINT II 
PETITIONER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS ENTITLED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
AT THE TIME OF INJURY. 
Petitioner was working in a prison-sponsored work program at 
the time of his injury on October 25, 1986. Without an 
understanding of the prison work programs, one might incorrectly 
assume that he would be entitled to benefits under the Workers 
Compensation Act, Section 35-1-45, which provides as follows: 
Every employee mentioned in Section 35-
1-43 who is injured . . . by accident arising 
out of, or in the course of his employment . 
• . shall be paid compensation for loss 
sustained on account of the injury . . . 
The relevant portions of Section 35-1-43, U.C.A., read as 
follows: 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" 
or "workman" and "operative" mean: 
(b) Each person in the service of 
any employer, as defined in 
Section 35-1-42, who employs 
one or more workers or 
operatives regularly in the 
same business or in or about 
the same establishment under 
any contract of hire, express 
of implied . . . (emphasis 
added) 
Attempts by the petitioner to define or interpret the word 
"employee" or "employer" misdirects the courts attention from the 
real issue as to whether or not prisoners or convicts can be 
accorded the status of "employee" under any circumstances, other 
than by an express contract (such as is required of those inmates 
or prisoners working under programs sponsored by the federal 
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government in which a prevailing wage and workers compensation 
benefits are mandated as a condition of the employment). 
Certainly prisoners and inmates involved in various 
rehabilitation work programs are working to the extent that they 
are rendering a service in the form of physical labor, but this 
in no way qualifies them as an employee under workers 
compensation statutes. 
If the 1993 amendments to Section 35-1-43, 64-13-16 and 64-
13-19 clarify the law rather than change the law, the 
Commission's determination must be upheld. In order to focus on 
this question, the statutory background, and legislative intent 
must be examined. Historically, confinement at hard labor was an 
accepted fact of prison life, with an emphasis on punishment. 
More recently, rehabilitation has become the objective. 
Section 64-13-6 sets forth the primary purpose of the 
Department of Corrections to include the following: 
(3) provision of rehabilitation 
opportunities to assist the criminal 
offender in functioning as a law-abiding 
and productive member of society; 
The foregoing provision was enacted by the Legislature in 1985. 
Also enacted in 1985 were Sections 64-13-16 and 64-13-19, which 
read as follows: 
64-13-16. Unless incapable of employment 
because of sickness or other infirmity, or 
for security reasons, inmates shall be 
employed on a regular basis, as is 
practicable. No inmate may be employed on 
work which benefits any employee or officer 
of a department. A percentage of net 
earnings paid inmates, as determined by the 
department, may be withheld and credited to a 
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savings account in the inmate's name. Any 
interest earned on the account shall also be 
credited. The funds shall be paid to inmates 
upon discharge or sooner at the discretion of 
the department. 
64-13-19. The department shall determine the 
types of labor to be pursued, and what kind, 
quality, and quantity of goods, materials and 
supplies shall be produced, manufactured, or 
repaired at the prisons. Contracts may be 
made for the labor of inmates, including 
contracts with any federal agency for a 
project affecting national defense. As many 
inmates as practicable may be employed to 
produce, manufacture or repair any goods, 
materials or supplies for the state or its 
political subdivisions. Prices for all 
goods, materials and supplies shall be fixed 
by the department. 
Lastly, the Legislature specified further legislative intent in 
64-13a-2 as follows: 
It is the intent of the Legislature in this 
chapter to: 
(1) Create a division of correctional 
industries which: 
a. is a self-supporting 
organization; 
b. is profit-oriented; 
c. generates revenue for its 
operations and capital investment; 
and 
d. assumes responsibility 
for training offenders in general 
work habits, work skills and 
specific training skills that 
increase their training prospects 
when released; 
(2) Provide an environment for the 
operation of correctional industries that 
closely resembles the environment for the 
business operations of a private corporate 
entity; 
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In 1979, the Utah Attorney General rendered Opinion No. 
79-90. In response to an inquiry whether prison inmates employed 
in prison industries programs were state employees, the opinion 
responded negatively. The opinion noted the general rule arising 
from case law in correlate jurisdictions denying inmates workers' 
compensation benefits. The opinion went on to note that the only 
three states to recognize a limited right of inmates to benefits 
did so expressly by statute. Although the Utah statutes 
governing inmate employment were changed in 1985, nothing in the 
1985 enactments suggests any conceptual change pertaining to the 
issue of workers1 compensation coverage. The Department of 
Corrections and the Industrial Commission therefore reasonably 
continued to rely on the opinion's unchallenged conclusion that 
inmates were not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. 
The very nature of the agreement between the Department of 
Corrections and claimant here reinforces the rehabilitative 
element of prison work and belies a true employment relationship. 
The agreement refers to claimant's participation in the 
Conservation Camp Program, not a job. Prison programs are 
rehabilitative in purpose. Of significance is the claimant's 
explicit waiver of claims of liability against the prison for any 
injuries sustained in the course of the program as follows: 
9. I release the Utah State Prison 
from any and all liability and responsibility 
for any injury received while in the 
Conservation Camp Program. Emergency 
treatment and proper medical attention will 
be provided or arranged for by the Utah State 
Prison Medical Department. 
-13-
The general law in the area of convicts and prisoners is 
articulated by Professor Arthur Larson in Section 47.31(a), 
Larson's Workers Compensation Law, as follows: 
Convicts and prisoners, by judicial 
decision, by statute, or sometimes by both, 
have usually been denied compensation for 
injuries sustained in connection with work 
done within the prison, even when some kind 
of reward attended their exertions (Note 
omitted). The reason given is that such a 
convict cannot and does not make a true 
contract of hire with the authorities by whom 
he is confined. The inducements which might 
be held out to him, in the form of extra 
food, or even money, are in no sense 
consideration for an enforceable contract of 
hire. 
The trend of some administrative agencies and a few courts 
has been to carve out exceptions to the general rule in recent 
years, but the rule still remains the majority rule and a number 
of states, including Utah, have enacted legislation in the last 
few years to clarify the original legislative intent reflected by 
the majority rule. (See Larson § 47.31 ft. note 13) 
Petitioner cites the case of Young v. Boundary County, 796 
P.2d 516 (Idaho 1990) and Clark County v. State of Nevada, 
Industrial Commission, 669 P.2d 730 (Nev. 1983) as authority for 
establishing himself as an employee entitled to workers1 
compensation. These cases deal with "non-traditional employees" 
(a jury member and an election clerk) and are clearly 
distinguishable from those involving a prisoner or inmate. 
Similarly, the cases cited by petitioner in support of what he 
perceives as the key test of the employee-employer relationship, 
"control", are likewise irrelevant. While control is a 
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determinative element generally in analyzing an employee-employer 
relationship, it has no applicability with respect to prisoners 
who work in rehabilitative programs and other opportunities 
provided by the prison in compliance with the legislative intent. 
POINT III 
PRISONERS IN UTAH HAVE NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED EMPLOYEES 
UNDER UTAH LAW FOR PURPOSES OF WORKERS COMPENSATION 
In 1993, the Utah legislature passed amendments to Sections 
35-1-43, 64-13-16 and 64-13-19 to clarify the status of prisoners 
and inmates performing various types of labor while at 
correctional facilities. These amendments clarified the status 
of these individuals, but in no way changed their status as 
contended by petitioner. There has been a recent trend in this 
jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions to carve out exceptions 
to the traditional rule or policy of denying workers1 
compensation coverage to convicts and prisoners. The majority of 
jurisdictions continues to deny such benefits, and other 
jurisdictions, including Utah, have taken recent steps to clarify 
existing law or reverse conflicting judicial decisions, as the 
case may be. Other states have acted to provide specific limited 
benefits following a prisoners release. It is clearly within the 
province of the legislature to do so, but no benefits are 
conferred without such direction. 
Petitioner raises as Point II of his Argument that prisoners 
were not made non-employees until 1993. These amendments became 
effective May 3, 1993. There significance was raised for the 
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first time in Petitioner's Brief. Accordingly, Respondents are 
entitled to address this issue and relevant legislative history. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated: 
When interpreting an ambiguous statute, 
we first try to discover the underlying 
intent of the legislature, guided by the 
purpose of the statute as a whole and the 
legislative history. Hansen v. Salt Lake 
County, 794 P.2d 838 841 (Utah 1990). 
In the instant case, the statute is not so much ambiguous as 
it is unclear as to whether it was ever intended to cover 
inmates. This court summarized the law relative to subsequent 
amendments in Kennecott Corporation v. Industrial Commission. 740 
P.2d 385 (Utah App. 1987) as follows: 
In workers1 compensation cases, rights 
and liabilities are determined as of the date 
the injury occurred. (Citations omitted.) 
Later statutes or amendments may not be 
applied retroactively to deprive a party of 
rights or improve greater liability unless 
the later statute or amendment clarifies or 
amplifies how the earlier law should have 
been understood. (Citations omitted.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Respondents believe that the three documents set forth in 
the addendum shed significant light on the legislature's intent 
in passing the 1993 amendments. These documents (addendum pp. ) 
were prepared by the Department of Corrections and submitted to 
the legislative committees for background information. Among the 
multiple concerns expressed by the Department of Corrections in 
these documents was the following fiscal comment: 
The fiscal impact of extending coverage 
to inmates would be substantial. Committing 
a large share of the state's scarce fiscal 
resources to a single cause requires a 
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careful balancing of competing social needs. 
Such social choices are best left to the 
discretion of the legislature, which is 
structurally responsive to public input from 
all elements of society. In the absence of 
clear legislative direction, leaving this 
decision to the courts inappropriately 
engages them in judicial policymaking. 
The lack of economic need during 
incarceration, the distinctive objective of 
inmate employment, and the availability of 
alternative means to address extended 
disability all contend against extension of 
workers1 compensation coverage to inmates. 
By way of an historical note, the department wrote: 
The eligibility of inmates for workers1 
compensation has been addressed in neither 
Utah statute nor Utah case law. Not until 
recently have any state jurisdictions applied 
workers1 compensation, even in limited form, 
to inmate populations, and the position 
holding inmates eligible is still a minority 
one. Because inmates have historically been 
regarded as ineligible, it is unlikely that 
the Utah legislature, in enacting the 
workers1 compensation statute, ever 
considered the issue of inmate coverage. The 
absence of explicit language regarding 
inmates in this historical context also 
suggests that the legislature did not intend 
inmate coverage. 
Respondent urges the Court to take judicial notice of the 
background information submitted by the Department of Corrections 
as set forth in these documents. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioner does not meet the statutory criteria which 
must be satisfied in order to qualify as an employee for purposes 
of workers compensation coverage. The legislature has never 
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specifically provided for such coverage and the legislative 
amendments passed in 1993 do no more than clarify existing law. 
This court should affirm the order of the Industrial 
Commission denying workers1 compensation benefits to the 
petitioner, Jeff Kofoed, on the grounds that the current law 
clearly excludes prisoners and inmates from coverage under 
workers compensation and there is no evidence that the 
legislature ever intended coverage in the past under the Workers 
Compensation Act. A determination to the contrary would have 
far-reaching consequences, both as to the budgetary requirements 
of the Department of Corrections and other correctional 
facilities, and as to the successful accomplishment of 
rehabilitative and training opportunities at .such correctional 
facilities. Such social and policy considerations are best left 
to the discretion of the legislature, whose obligation it is to 
balance the needs of society with the need to promote effectual 
rehabilitative and training opportunities at various correctional 
facilities. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 ^ day of October, 1993. 
G. Sumsion 
Attorney for Respondents, 
Department of Corrections and 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
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:«ji mi uwnpensaiion FIE?: 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 92000395 
JEFF KOFOED, 
VS. 
Applicant. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and/or * 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND * 
OF UTAH, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 
21, 1992, at 1:00 o'clock a.m.; same being 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law 
Judge. 
Applicant . was present and represented by John 
Preston Creer, Attorney at Law. 
Defendants were represented by Richard G. Sumsion, 
Attorney at Law, Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 
Ralph Adams, Attorney at Law, Department of 
Corrections. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Administra-
tive Law Judge found and concluded that the applicant was an 
employee of the Department of Corrections on August 25, 1986. As 
required by law, I am prepared to enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant herein, Jeff Kofoed, is and was an inmate of the 
Utah State Prison. In October of 1985, the applicant entered the 
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Utah State Prison for a credit card violation* On or about July 
20, 1986, he became a fire fighter at the Utah State Prison. 
The applicant was allowed to volunteer and as an inmate sign up for 
the Conservation Camp at the Utah State Prison based on his 
conduct. The purpose of the Conservation Camp was to perform 
conservation and fire suppression activities both in the state of 
Utah and throughout the West. The program which the applicant was 
involved in, was a joint program between the Department of 
Corrections and the Division of State Lands and Forestry, according 
to the testimony of the deputy warden. That program, consists of 
the Lone Peak State Nursery and the Conservation Camp, which are 
located at the prison. The Conservation Camp program was not 
housed with the regular prison population, but rather, was housed 
at the Lone Peak facility. 
As part of the Conservation Camp Resident's Agreement, the 
applicant agreed that he would remain in the program for a minimum 
of one year. The Agreement also noted that the applicant's 
••Participation in the Conservation Camp is purely voluntary." In 
addition, that Agreement required that the applicant satisfactorily 
complete the MFire Fighting training program and Advanced First Aid 
by the American Red Cross, and other training as needed or 
assigned." As a result, the applicant received his training, and 
fought approximately 30 fires during the summer of 1986. In late 
August of 1986, the applicant had been fighting fires in Oregon, 
when he was assigned to a fire in Idaho. 
On August 25, 1986, the applicant was traveling in a van to 
the scene of a fire on public land in Idaho. As he was traveling 
in the van, the van went off a cliff. The applicant sustained 
injuries to his low back. He was treated in Boise, and received a 
low back x-ray and was informed that he had sustained a really bad 
bruise. The applicant was given pain medication, and was hospital-
ized for three days. He was then returned to the Utah State 
Prison. 
The applicant had intermittent sharp stabbing pains which he 
reported to the Conservation Camp supervisor, Lieutenant Johnstun. 
The applicant had pain killing drugs prescribed for his condition, 
but pursuant to prison rules, he was unable to receive that 
medication. Instead, the applicant was given aspirin and anti-
inflammatory medication. The applicant testified that his low back 
pain gradually worsened over the years. Between 1987 and 1990, the 
applicant was paroled a total of approximately 18 months. The 
applicant denied any low back injuries while on parole. 
In December of 1988, the applicant was in a racial fight at 
the prison, and was struck on the cheek with a 2'x4' board. The 
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applicant was rendered unconscious, and testified that he thought 
that he had fractured his cheek. The applicant testified that his 
back hurt but that he received no treatment for it. 
In January of 1990, the applicant returned to the fire 
fighting program and stayed in that program until November of 1990. 
The applicant testified that his job at that time was to drive one 
of the vans. While so engaged, the applicant noticed that his 
right leg was going numb. He reported his problem to the staff, 
but they concluded that the applicant was trying to get out of work 
on the first three occasions that he complained. Finally, a 
medical assistant examined the applicant and informed him that 
maybe he had an inflamed low back muscle. The applicant was 
paroled in November of 1990. 
In January of 1991, the applicant started having increasing 
low back pain, which was increasing in both frequency and severity. 
The applicant thought that it was sore muscles, and testified that 
he had sustained no trauma during that time to his low back. While 
he was admitted to the Project Reality Program, the applicant 
complained of low back pain to the people there. In March or April 
of 1991, the applicant went to the St. Mark's Emergency Room, and 
was told at that facility that he would need a CT scan of his low 
back. However, the applicant did not have the $800 cost and so he 
did not receive that diagnostic study. On May 6, 1991, the 
applicant reported to Dr. Hagen, for chiropractic evaluation. Dr. 
Hagen diagnosed an inflamed nerve in the applicant's back. In June 
of 1991, the applicant was returned to the Utah State Prison 
because of a revoked parole. 
The applicant continued complaining of low back pain, a note 
in the prison medical records indicates that the applicant on 
August 22, 1991, had a request to work in the kitchen "Disapproved 
due to chronic low back pain.,f As indicated, the applicant kept 
complaining of low back pain, and would see the medical technician, 
whom he described as a "pill pusher", who would tell the applicant 
that he would give the doctor the applicant's notes requesting a 
visit with the doctor. The applicant noticed a pain down his right 
leg, and he kept filling out requests to see the doctor. Finally, 
the physician's assistant came out and gave the applicant an exam 
and gave him Naprosyn, and informed him that if his condition 
worsened, he should let the physician's assistant know. The 
applicant's condition did worsen, and on September 23, 1991, he was 
given a three day "lay-in" to see the doctor. Unfortunately, the 
doctor never appeared. After four days, the applicant returned to 
his teacher's assistant duties at the prison. On September 27, 
1991, the doctor did see the applicant, and informed that he could 
not do anything for the applicant but give him medication. The 
applicant filed a grievance with the prison for the purpose of 
seeing a doctor and getting definitive medical treatment. In 
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October of 1991, the applicant went to the doctor and the doctor 
recommended that the applicant have a CT scan. That CT scan was 
performed on November 8, 1991. That scan indicated that the 
applicant had herniated discs at L3-.4 and L5-S1. On January 3, 
1992, sometime after the CT scan of November 8, 1991, the applicant 
was told by prison staff that his low back problem was genetic. 
The applicant filed a grievance regarding his inability to get fair 
medical treatment. The applicant was informed by the prison that 
he was getting fair treatment. 
In January of 1992, the applicant was informed that he was to 
see Dr. Reichman. The applicant did see Dr. Reichman on January 
13, 1992, and Dr. Reichman informed the applicant that he had 
herniated discs, and that they were not the result of any genetic 
condition. He also informed the applicant that he would need 
surgery, and would schedule the same for March 4, 1992. However, 
the applicant was never informed of the surgical date, instead 
someone from the Utah State Prison called the doctor's office and 
canceled the surgery. Shortly thereafter, the applicant was 
paroled on March 10, 1992. 
On April 8, 1992, the applicant had low back surgery performed 
by Dr. Reichman. Dr. Reichman performed microdiscectomy surgery at 
L5-S1. The applicant apparently had an uneventful recovery from 
his surgery. 
In June of 1992, the applicant was returned to Utah State 
Prison for failing the drug screening test. 
The Deputy Warden testified that the Division of State Lands 
and Forestry invoices the Fire Fighting inmates services at $6.00 -
$6.50 per hour. He testified that the Utah State Prison, however, 
only receives the cost of the inmate wage of $3.50 per hour, and 
the Division of State Lands and Forestry pockets the remainder. 
The Division of State Lands and Forestry also provides the 
equipment that the inmates need in addition to the wage. The 
prison's Director of Support Services testified that there is no 
withholding from the funds paid to the prisoners, because the 
prison has concluded that those payments are a "Stipend", and are 
not "Wages" since the prison had no intent to pay wages. However, 
Mr. Latham did indicate that the prison does pay workers compensa-
tion premiums on some of its Utah Correctional Industries employ-
ees, because of Federal law requirements. 
In denying the applicant workers compensation benefits in this 
matter, the prison has raised a number of defenses. Initially, the 
prison indicated that the applicant should not receive workers 
compensation benefits, because he is a "volunteer". Apparently, 
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the Utah State Prison has in mind the Volunteer Government Workers 
Act, Section 67-20-1 et seq., specifically, it would appear that 
the defendants are referring to Section 67-2-2 (sub(2)), which 
provides the following: 
"Community service worker" means any person 
who has been convicted of a criminal offense, 
any youth who has been adjudged delinquent, or 
any person or youth who has been diverted from 
the criminal or juvenile justice system and 
who performs a public service for an agency as 
a condition of his sentence, diversion, proba-
tion or parole. 
That definition is important, since Section 67-20-6, provides: 
A community service worker is considered a 
government employee for purposes of receiving 
workers compensation benefits, which shall be 
the exclusive remedy for all injuries and 
occupational diseases as provided under Chap-
ters 1 and 2, title 35. 
Based on the foregoing, the issue now arises as to whether or 
tot the applicant is, in fact, a community service worker as 
:ontemplated by the Volunteer Workers Act. Section 2, quoted above 
provides that a community service worker is a person who has been 
tonvicted of a criminal offense, which obviously the applicant has. 
[owever, the applicant does not satisfy the other requirement of 
hat section, which is that he must have "been diverted from the 
riminal or juvenile justice system.. . . ". 
There was no evidence offered at the time of the evidentiary 
earing that the applicant was, in fact, diverted as that term is 
ormally understood in the criminal justice parlance. As under-
tood by the Administrative Law Judge, a diversion program is a 
rogram whereby a person charged with a. crime rather than being 
ncarcerated in a penal institution is instead "diverted" into a 
rogram where some community service is performed in lieu of 
ncarceration in a penal institution. As indicated, there is no 
vidence that the applicant was in any kind of diversion program, 
id accordingly, he would not qualify for workers compensation 
snefits as a community service worker. 
The defendants also contend that the applicant is not entitled 
> workers compensation benefits for the reason that there is no 
>luntary bilateral contract of hire. In relying on this defense, 
le defendants rely on the general rule in this area, as so ably 
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articulated by the authority in this area, Professor Larsen in 
Section 47.31 (a) of his treatise, Larsen's Workmens Compensation 
Law. In that Section, Dr. Larsen states: 
Convicts and prisoners by, judicial decision, 
by statute, or sometimes by both, have usually 
been denied compensation for injuries sus-
tained in connection with work done within the 
prison, even when some kind of reward attended 
their exertions. (Note omitted) The reason 
given is that such a convict cannot and does 
not make a true contract of hire with the 
authorities by whom he is confined. The 
inducements which might be held out to him, in 
the form of extra food or even money, are in 
no sense consideration for an enforceable 
contract of hire. 
Applying the foregoing to the situation involved in the case 
at bar, I must note that the Administrative Law Judge is aware of 
no judicial decision or statute which would forbid the awarding of 
workers compensation benefits to the claimant in this matter* As 
indicated by Dr. Larsen, the. decisions and statutes have denied 
compensation to inmates who were injured while working within the 
prison. However, an important distinction must be made in this 
case, that distinction being that the applicant herein was not 
injured while working within the prison. In fact, the applicant 
herein was not even injured in the state of Utah. Therefore, an 
important distinction is present in this case. 
As indicated, there being no Utah statute or case law on 
point, this case, thus, is one of first impression. As such, I 
will look to the generally accepted authority in this.area, Dr. 
Larsen, for guidance in determining if the applicant's injury is 
compensable under the Utah Workers Compensation Act. In this 
regard, Dr. Larsen is especially helpful in Section 47.31 (d)• In 
that section, Dr. Larsen sets forth the approach which should be 
taken in cases such as the instant one: "There has been a greater 
inclination to find employee status for prisoners when, instead of 
merely working within the prison, thev have been lent to other 
state agencies or even private employers. (Note omitted) I^ arsen, 
Section 47.31 (d) . It should be remembered that in this case, the 
applicant was lent to the Division of State Lands and Forestry for 
the purpose of fighting fires throughout Utah and the western 
United States. The Division of Lands received either $6.00 or 
$6.50 per hour for the applicant's fire fighting services, of which 
they paid the applicant, $3.50 per hour.* 
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In the following passage, Dr. Larsen persuasively sets forth 
the policy reasons for granting compensation in cases such as the 
applicant's: 
Although the basic rule denying compensation 
to prisoners seems to be a correct application 
of any statute requiring a "Contract of Hire", 
the result may in some circumstances be out of 
tune with the conditions of modern society. 
It is well known that many prisons nowadays 
operate elaborate factories making twine, 
license plates, clothing, furniture and other 
things. Prisoners are also lent to highway 
departments for road work in some states. All 
the external features and all the risks of 
ordinary employment are present. However, 
little value one may assign to the rights of a 
prisoner during his confinement, (note omit-
ted) , one should never forget that, in most 
instances, he will not always be a prisoner, 
and the permanent partial or total disability 
which he acquires in prison will create the 
same social problem after he returns to civil 
life as if the injury occurred while he was 
free. (Note omitted). 
In view of the foregoing reasoning and considering the 
beneficent purpose of the Utah Workers Compensation Act and the 
case law directive that the Act is to be liberally construed in 
favor of coverage, I find that Jeff Kofoed was an employee of the 
Department of Corrections on August 25, 1986. 
On the date of his industrial accident, the applicant was 
earning $3.50 per hour. His Application for Hearing alleges that 
the applicant was working 5 5 - 6 0 hours per week. The answer to 
the claim filed by the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah did not 
specifically admit or deny the applicant's claim in that regard. 
Accordingly, the amount of the applicant's permanent partial 
impairment and temporary total compensation benefits is reserved 
pending submission of payroll records by the Utah State Prison to 
the Commission immediately. 
The defendants have also challenged the medical causal 
connection between the applicant's industrial injury of August 25, 
1986, and his surgery of April 8, 1992. Accordingly, upon 
resolution of the legal issues in this matter, the applicant will 
be referred to the medical panel for its evaluation. Specifically, 
the medical panel will be asked if the surgery of April 8, 1992, 
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was a result of the industrial accident, and what period of 
temporary total disability resulted from that industrial injury and 
also, the extent of the permanent impairment resulting from the 
industrial accident. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Jeff Kofoed for workers compensation purposes was an employee 
of The Department of Corrections on August 25, 1986. The applicant 
is entitled to workers compensation benefits as provided by law for 
his industrial accident of August 25, 1986. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that The Department of Corrections 
furnish payroll records for Jeff Kofoed covering the period July 
1986 through August 1986, said records to be submitted immediately. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issue of medical causation, for 
the surgery of April 8, 1992, the period of temporary total 
disability, and the permanent impairment attributable to the 
industrial accident are hereby reserved, pending resolution of the 
legal issues. Upon resolution of those legal issues, the matter 
shall be referred to the medical panel for its evaluation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
APPENDIX n 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH ° r f * 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-6600 WAR 0 2 
Jeff Kofoed, * Workers * 
* 
Applicant, * GRANT OF MOTION 
vs. * FOR REVIEW 
State of Utah/ Department of * 
Corrections, Workers Compensa- * Case No. 9200395 
tion Fund and Employers' Rein- * ^ . L ^  ^ 
surance Fund, * Lyt'l04(j)7^%£j 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the 
motion for review of respondents in the above captioned matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-
46b-12. 
The provisions of U.C.A. Sections 35-1-1 et. seq. are 
applicable in this case. 
The order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is presumed to 
be lawful and reasonable "until it is found otherwise in an action 
brought for that purpose, or until altered or revoked by the 
commission.11 U.C.A. Section 35-1-20 (1953). 
The statutes further provide that: 
A substantial compliance with the requirements of 
this title [Title 35] shall be sufficient to give 
effect to the orders of the commission, and they 
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void 
for any gufission of a technical nature. 
U.C.A. Section 3*5-1-33 (1953). 
The Commission has "the duty ... and ... full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to •.. administer and enforce all laws 
for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees," U.C.A. Section 35-1-16(1)(a)(1953), and to "consider 
and determine" the matters in issue, U.C.A. Section 35-1-24 (1953). 
Additional evidence that the Commission has been granted 
discretion in its determinations is shown by U.C.A. Section 35-1-88 
(1965) which provides: 
...The commission may make its investigation in 
such manner as in its judgment is best calcula-
ted to ascertain the substantial rights of the 
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parties and to carry out justly the spirit of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The preceding statute relates to matters at hearings, and 
shows the extent to which the legislature desired to provide the 
Commission with the necessary discretion to reach a decision. This 
statute also provides the authority for the Commission to deviate 
from common-law rules, statutory rules of evidence, technical or 
formal rules of procedure, unless provided for in the workers' 
compensation act, or unless otherwise adopted by Commission rules. 
Id. 
Thus, the statutes expressly and impliedly give the 
Commission, commensurate with its statutory duty, broad authority 
and discretion to interpret, construe, consider, and determine the 
matters before it in the workers' compensation arena. 
The respondents on December 11, 1992 requested that we review 
the November 12, 1992 order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) 
finding that the applicant who was a prisoner confined to the 
custody of the Department of Corrections (hereafter Corrections), 
and who was injured in a traffic accident while travelling in a van 
en route to fight a forest fire in Idaho, was an employee entitled 
to the benefits of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. The 
applicant encourages us to uphold the order of the ALJ as being 
sound policy. 
The relevant facts are recited by the ALJ, and there does not 
appear to be any disagreement with them by the parties. 
The applicant while a prisoner volunteered for the 
Conservation Camp (hereafter Camp) at the Utah State Prison. The 
purpose of the Camp was to perform fire fighting and conservation 
activities throughout the West including Utah. The Camp was a 
joint program between the Division of State Lands and Forestry, and 
the Department of Corrections. The Camp was not located with the 
regular prison population, but was instead housed at the Lone Peak 
facility. 
The agreement between the applicant and the Camp stated that 
the applicant's participation was voluntary, and that he agreed to 
remain in the program for at least one year. Also agreed to were 
some training courses which were completed by the applicant. 
During the summer of 1986, the applicant fought approximately 30 
fires. Apparently, the Division of Lands received between $6 -
6.50 per hour for the applicant's fire fighting services, and the 
applicant was given $3.50 per hour. 
As stated, while travelling to Idaho, the applicant was 
injured when the van in which he was riding plunged off a cliff. 
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He sustained low back injuries, and was diagnosed as having a bad 
bruise. He was hospitalized for three days. Over the years, his 
"pain increased. He has alternately been in and out of prison 
during the relevant period, and he ultimately had surgery on April 
8, 1992. 
The Department of Corrections had custody of the applicant as 
shown by the pertinent statute: 
All offenders committed for incarceration in 
a state correctional facility, for supervision 
on probation or parole, or for evaluation, shall 
be placed in the custody of the department. The 
department shall establish procedures and is re-
sponsible for the appropriate assignment or trans-
fer of public offenders to facilities or programs. 
U.C.A. Section 64-13-7 (1953 as amended). 
Traditionally, inmates have been denied worker's compensation 
for injuries sustained during assigned prison work. Larson, infra. 
at Section 47.31. Apparently, with the exception of Wyoming, none 
of the states surrounding Utah provide worker's compensation 
coverage to inmates. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 23-
901(5)(f)(West 1985)(individual confined to a penal institution is 
not an employee of the department) ; Watson v. Ind. Comm'n, 414 P.2d 
144 (Ariz. 1966)(trustee injured while working on prison farm was 
not covered by worker's compensation); Parson's v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeals Bd., 179 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1981)(county prisoner 
granted probation and subsequently injured while working was not an 
employee of the county); Colo. Cum. Supp. Sect. 8-40-301(3)(a) & 
(b) (1992)(city, county, or state prisoners participating in any 
training, rehabilitation, or work program are not eligible for 
workers' compensation unless working for private employer); Shain 
v. Idaho State Pen. , 291 P.2d 870 (Id. 1955) (prisoner injured while 
working in license plate factory at the state penitentiary was not 
an employee within the terms of workmen's compensation); Scott v. 
City of Hobbs. 366 P.2d 854 (N.M. 1961) (city prisoner injured while 
working on city street was not entitled to compensation); 172 Nev. 
Op. Att'y Gen. 48 (1974)(Nevada attorney general opinion recommends 
denial of mandatory workers' compensation coverage to inmates); WS 
Title 27-14-108(c)VI (WY 1977 as amended)(prisoners are covered by 
workers7 compensation when performing work pursuant to law or court 
order). 
There is no Utah statute or any case law which deals with the 
question before us. However, there is an informal opinion of the 
Utah attorney general which states that inmates are not covered by 
workers' compensation. Opinion No, 79-90, Utah attorney gen'l. 
The Utah attorney general reasoned that Utah Code Annotated Section 
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35-1-43 (1953 as amended) required for qualification as "employees" 
under this section that prisoners must be serving the state under 
an express or implied contract of hire. 
Further, the attorney general went on to explain that "[t]he 
relationship between the state and its prisoners is the antithesis 
of voluntary employment. All imprisonment is at hard labor ... The 
state does not employ prisoners at will, is not obligated to pay 
wages to them, and obviously does not intend an employer-employee 
relationship. Likewise, prisoners do not enter the reformatory to 
find work." 
Although many of the provisions mentioning "hard labor" have 
been abrogated or replaced in the punishment provisions of the Utah 
Code, current statutes do show that the legislative intent is for 
inmates to do labor: 
Unless incapable of employment because of 
sickness or other infirmity or for securi-
ty reasons, the department may employ in-
mates to the degree that funding and avai-
lable resources allow. An offender may not 
be employed on work which benefits any em-
ployee or officer of the department. 
U.C.A. Section 64-14-16 (1953 as amended). 
There is no indication in this legislation, however, that 
there is any legislative intention to create an employer-employer 
relationship. We construe the term "employ" in the above statute 
to be synonymous with the word "work." 
Another section which pertains to county government, shows a 
similar intent to allow labor to be performed for the public 
benefit. 
They may provide for the working of prisoners 
confined in the county jail under convictions 
for misdemeanors, under the direction of some 
responsible person, for the benefit of the coun-
ty, upon public grounds, roads, streets, alleys, 
highways or public buildings, when under such 
judgment of conviction or existing laws such 
prisoners are liable to labor. 
U.C.A. Section 17-5-31 (1953). 
The instant case does not involve a work release situation 
which we believe can involve a true employer-employee relationship 
entitling a prisoner in a work-release status to 
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workers' compensation. In the work release situation, it is 
apparently the intention of the legislature to require that certain 
minimum conditions of employment be met. The statute relating to 
work release provides: 
(6) An inmate who is housed at a nonsecure 
correctional facility and on work release may 
not be required to work for less than the cur-
rent federally established minimum wage, or un-
der substandard working conditions. U.C.A. Sec-
tion 64-13-14.5 (1953 as amended). 
Corrections raises a number of defenses. First, Corrections 
states that the decision of the ALJ is contrary to Utah public 
policy; second, that the claim may be barred by the statute of 
limitations in U.C.A. Section 35-1-99; and, third, that the ALJ 
could not enter a final order because there were issues remaining 
to.be resolved. 
We will address the first issue of public policy. Prisoners 
and convicts have usually been denied compensation for injuries 
sustained in connection with work done within the prison even when 
some kind of reward or payment is made. Larsen, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, Section 47.31(a). The reason normally given is 
that such a convict cannot and does not make a true contract of 
hire with the authorities by whom he is confined. Id. 
The ALJ determined that there was a distinction between the 
circumstances in the instant case and the explanation given by 
Professor Larsen. 
As Professor Larsen has stated: 
Convicts and prisoners by judicial decision, 
by statute, or sometimes by both, have usu-
ally been denied compensation for injuries 
sustained in connection with work done with-
in the prison, even when some kind of reward 
attended their exertions. (Note omitted). 
The reason given is that such a convict can-
not and does not make a true contract of hire 
with the authorities by whom he is confined. 
The inducements which might be held out to 
him, in the form of extra food or even money, 
are in no sense consideration for an enforce-
able contract of hire. 
Section 47.31(a), Larsen's Workmen's Compensation Law. 
In the instant case, the ALJ reasoned, the applicant was 
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performing his duties outside the prison whereas Professor Larsen 
was describing work done within the prison. To us, we see little 
difference as to the geographical location of where the duties were 
performed. 
The applicant was under the custodianship of Corrections, and 
was not free to exercise the rights of other citizens. He was thus 
deprived of certain liberties whether he was within the prison 
walls or was outside the walls. In this day when various prison 
programs allow prisoners to perform their punishment/ 
rehabilitation outside the prison, we see no reason for the 
distinction. In fact, in the appropriate case, a prisoner within 
the walls of prison, as well as outside, could still be considered 
to be an employee as long as there is "any contract of hire, 
express or implied, oral or written...." U.C.A. Section 35-1-42 
(1953 as amended 1992). There must be evidence of an employee-
employer relationship between Corrections and the prisoner, and we 
cannot imply such a relationship under the circumstances. 
A review of the so-called agreement between the Conservation 
Camp and the applicant reflects an emphasis * on proper behavior, 
good citizenship, and rehabilitation. There is no discussion of 
wages or other employment features normally discussed in an 
employment agreement. See Exh. D-2. In addition, we find no 
evidence that there was any voluntary bilateral employment 
agreement, express or implied, but to the contrary the applicant 
was enrolled in a prison program of rehabilitation not rising to 
the level of employment. See e.g., Bd of Educ. of Alpine School 
Dist. v. Olsen. 684 P.2d 49, 50-51 (Utah 1984). The fact that 
there were some rewards associated with the Conservation Camp does 
not provide him coverage under workers' compensation. Gourdin v. 
SCERA. 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah Sup. Ct. Dec. 28, 1992). 
The current Utah Constitution provides one prohibition in the 
area of convict labor: 
The Legislature shall prohibit: 
* * * 
(2) The involuntary contracting of convict labor. 
* * * * 
Utah Const. Art. XVI, Section 3. 
This provision does not seem relevant to our current inquiry 
since it appears to be designed to prevent convict labor from 
competing with other labor in connection with private employment. 
See e.g. Utah Mfrs.' Ass'n v. Mabev, 63 Utah 374, 226 P. 189 (1924) 
which interpreted a similar phrase in the 1924 version of U.C.A. 
Section 64-13-19 to have reference to the old practice of states to 
lease or hire prisoners to private individuals or corporations. 
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Since we have resolved the issue of employment against the 
applicant, we do not reach the other issues asserted by the 
respondents such as the claim being barred by the statute of 
limitations in U.C.A. Section 35-1-99 (1953 as amended 1988 and 
repealed 1990), or medical causation. 
The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders of the 
ALJ are therefore reversed, and we substitute our findings, 
conclusions and order• 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated November 12, 1992 is set aside, and the application is 
dismissed with prejudice, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date of the order, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82•53(2), 35-1-86, 63-46b-16, 
and Couriers v. Dep/t of Empl. Sec, et al., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 
(CA, 12/4/92). The requesting party shall bear all costs to 
prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chaii 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
Certified this $j£: day of ^ A ^ , 
ATTEST: -. 
Patricia 0. Ash 
Commission Seer 
1993. 
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RATIONALE 
Utah case law has long held that the purpose of workers' 
compensation is to provide injured employees a measure of financial 
security during employment-induced disability. This rationale is 
inapplicable to an inmate who, by means of his criminal conduct, 
has already disabled his earning capacity. The inmate's basic 
needs for food, clothing, shelter, and medical care (including any 
medical attention necessitated by work-related injury) are met by 
virtue of his incarcerated status; therefore, he does not have 
financial requirements comparable to the injured non-inmate whose 
income must provide for these needs. Because the inmate does not 
incur expenses similar to the non-offender, compensation for his 
injuries would take on the properties of an inducement or reward 
for injury rather than a reimbursement for losses incurred due to 
injury. The rehabilitative purpose of inmate employment should 
also be noted: the transferable social and work skills acquired, 
rather than the money earned, are the objective. Finally, it is 
important to recognize that inmates have no property interest in 
their jobs, and can be terminated from these positions at any time 
or for any reason. 
To the extent that an inmate's injury may cause a disability 
that outlasts his incarceration, alternative remedies are 
available. Social Security disability benefits can be sought on 
the basis of his condition. Benefits for dependents may also be 
available. State-assisted job retraining and rehabilitation may be 
available independently or as an adjunct to Social Security 
benefits. It is significant that these are also options used by. 
disabled non-offenders and are therefore not stigmatizing to former 
inmates as a class. It is also important that these remedies, 
unlike workers' compensation, do not act as incentives to self-
injury. 
The eligibility of inmates for workers' compensation has been 
addressed in neither Utah statute nor Utah case law. Not until 
recently have any state jurisdictions applied workers' 
compensation, even in limited form, to inmate populations, and the 
position holding inmates eligible is still a minority one. Because 
inmates have historically been regarded as ineligible, it is 
unlikely that the Utah legislature, in enacting the workers' 
compensation statute, ever considered the issue of inmate coverage. 
The absence of explicit language regarding inmates in this 
historical context also suggests that the legislature did not 
intend inmate coverage. 
The fiscal impact of extending coverage to inmates would be 
substantial. Committing a large share of the state's scarce fiscal 
resources to a single cause requires a careful balancing of 
competing social needs. Such social choices are best left to the 
discretion of the legislature, which is structurally responsive to 
public input from all elements of society. In the absence of clear 
legislative direction, leaving this decision to the courts 
inappropriately engages them in judicial policymaking-
The lack of economic need during incarceration, the 
distinctive objective of inmate employment, and the availability of 
alternative means to address extended disability all contend 
against extension of workers' compensation coverage to inmates. 
P:W0RKC0MP.ME2 38 
DISCUSSION: WORKERS' COMPENSATION AMENDMENTS 
1. Uninsured Employers' Fund Not Implicated. 
If inmates are removed from the definition of "employee," 
funds are not available to them from the Uninsured Employers' Fund 
(Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-107). This is a statutorily created fund 
which provide benefits to eligible employees under specified 
circumstances. A threshold requirement for eligibility is employee 
status. Under the proposed amendments, inmates could not meet this 
threshold requirement and would be unable to recover from these 
funds. (See § 35-1-107(1): "The fund has the purpose of assisting 
in the payment of workers' compensation benefits to any person 
entitled to them . . . " ) . However, even if an inmate were found to 
meet this threshold burden and to be eligible for workers' 
compensation benefits, the Uninsured Employers' Fund would not be 
implicated because the state is an insured entity. 
2. Workers' Compensation Benefits Inappropriate. 
A. Inmates' Basic Needs Met. 
An inmate's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and medical 
care are met by the very nature of incarceration. Recovery of 
benefits to meet these needs is therefore redundant. The inmate's 
loss of earning capacity derives from the fact of incarceration, 
not from injury. Prison work is a management and rehabilitation 
tool, not employment in the ordinary sense. 
B. Wage Replacement Benefits Create Incentive for Injury. 
Statutory benefits provided by workers' compensation are 
excessive or inappropriate for most inmate employees. Utah Code 
Ann. S 35-1-65, for instance, states that temporary disability 
benefits shall be "a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child tinder the age of 
eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children 
. . .-. For a relatively well-paid inmate earning $0.75 per hour, 
full-time weekly wages for forty hours would reach only $30. Most 
inmates earn substantially less than $0.75 per hour. However, even 
at this higher rate, temporary disability benefits become an 
incentive for injury, as they provide greater compensation than the 
inmate can obtain by working. 
C. Medical Benefits Implicate Prison Management Concerns. 
Another example of an inappropriate benefit is the change of 
physician permitted an injured employee by Utah Admin. Code R568-2-
9A2, which permits the employee to make one change of doctor 
without requesting the permission of the insurance carrier. 
Inmates' medical care is given by the prison's health care 
providers, who may refer the inmate to selected outside providers 
as deemed necessary. A change of physician at the inmate's 
39 
discretion would implicate the prison's legitimate security and 
management interests ( e.g., scheduling, transportation, public 
safety) as well as its fiscal resources. Further, the 
constitutional standard for medical care is different from that in 
the private sector. If an inmate is being treated pursuant to 
workers' compensation, which standard applies—negligence or 
deliberate indifference? 
3. Permanent Injuries Rare. 
Few work-related injuries sustained in the prison context are 
of a magnitude that impacts post-incarceration activity. It is a 
better use of the state's fiscal resources to settle such claims on 
a case-by-case basis than to pay expensive workers' compensation 
insurance premiums for each inmate on the possibility that a 
significant injury may occur. 
4. Alternative Non-Stigmatizing Remedies Available. 
Social Security provides disability benefits. State-assisted 
job training and/or rehabilitation may be available independently 
or as an adjunct. Dependent benefits may also be available. Non-
offenders who sustain disabling conditions in non-work-related 
contexts also use these options. 
5. Workers' Compensation Provided for Private Sector/Prison 
Industries Enhancement (PS/PIE^ Programs Paving Market Wages. 
Inmates who are paid prevailing market wages under federally 
authorized programs are provided workers' compensation coverage. 
However, unlike inmates serving in non-certified programs, these 
workers have income tax withheld and pay certain expenses of 
incarceration as well as victim reparations. 
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(STATE GOVERNMENT - WORKERS' COMPENSATION AMENDMENT) 
Existing Coverage For Inmates 
With the exception of a very few inmates working in a federally certified private 
sector/prison industry program, no inmates in Utah Prisons are insured under 
Workers' Compensation. 
Reason for Concern 
The eligibility of inmates for workers' compensation has been addressed in neither 
Utah statute nor Utah case law. Not until recently have any state jurisdictions 
applied workers' compensation, even in limited form, to inmate populations, and 
the position holding inmates eligible is still a minority one. Because inmates have 
historically been regarded as ineligible, it is unlikely that the Utah legislature, in 
enacting the workers' compensation statute, ever considered the issue of inmate 
coverage. The absence of explicit language regarding inmates in this historical 
context also suggests that the legislature did not intend inmate coverage. Isolated 
recent Administrative Law Judge decisions have found In favor of Inmates 
who have applied for benefits under workers compensation. These decisions 
appear to have occurred because existing Utah statutes do not specifically 
exclude Inmates from the definition of "employee." 
Possible Ramifications if Inmates Are Not Excluded From The Definition of Employees 
We are concerned that if inmates are not specifically excluded from the definition 
of "employee," their may be very costly ramifications beyond workers' 
compensation issues. 
Inmates may be eligible for FLSA considerations. This would mean the inmates 
working in the prison laundry, food service, correctional industries, or other 
work/training programs would be eligible for federal minimum wages for services 
performed. 
We are concerned that if inmates are not specifically excluded from the definition 
of "employee," the Utah Department of Corrections may be required to insure all 
working inmates under workers's compensation. It is estimated that insurance 
premiums could range from $75,000 to $300,000 per year for current inmate 
populations, and would grow each year as more offenders are sent to prison. 
Additionally, since inmates would be considered employees of the State, according 
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to workers's compensation staff, if a disproportionate amount of claims started 
coming from the prison, the rate structure for the entire State would need to be 
adjusted. 
The cost for insurance premiums, would in the most part be funded out of the 
corrections budget. Corrections would need to receive this increased budget or 
severely curtail inmate work/training programs. 
Additionally, if inmates in work/training programs are classified as employees of 
the State and FLSA requirements apply, payrolls for inmates doing routine 
maintenance, laundry, grounds keeping, and other duties would go up by a 
magnitude of 10. This could add $10 to $20 million to the corrections budget. 
4? 
I , /w*l/w/ A (^Hy^^- agree to the following rules, guidelines, 
un^ prc£i/edures^ /6f cue Utah State Prison Conservation Camp. 
i. 1 will obey all State and Federal Laws. 
2. I will comply to all institutional rules governing my behavior: (i.e. N'O 
drugs, alcohol, etc,; no unauthorized visitors). 
3. I will realize that 1 am not available for personal endeavors. 
*. I will work hare and follow instructions given by fire fighter supervisors, 
prison staff and designated squad bosses. 
5. I will satisfactorly complete the Fire Fighting Training Program and advanced 
firfet aid by The American Red Cross, and other training as needed or assigned. 
i). I agree to participate in all community service projects assigned and perform 
in a manner to bring credit tu myself and the program. 
7. I will follow through on all work assignments pledging to~make my best efforts 
from the time of departure until time of return to the institution. 
S. 1 recognize that there may be a possibility of danger and injury resulting 
from my participation in the Conservation Camp. 
9. I release the Utah State Prison from any and all liability and responsibility 
for any injury received while in the Conservation Camp Program. Emergency 
treatment and proper medical attention will be provided or arranged for by 
the Utah State Prison Medical Department. 
10. My participation in the Conservation Camp is purely voluntary. 1 recognize 
that no special treatment of favors are due me as a result of my participation. 
11. I realize I will be on probation for-^u days and can be removed from the 
program for failure to perform up to expected standards at any time during 
this period, or anytime in the future 1 fail to perform to expected standards. 
12. I pledge that my personal conduct while living in the Conservation Camp and 
any off property activities will be of the highest standards. I also pledge 
to help others and to accept help from them to maintain this high standard. 
13. Any Major Disciplinary or Minor Disciplinary action may be cause for immediate 
removal from the Conservation Camp, forfeiting all priviledges earned up to 
date of removal. 
14. I desire to participate in the Conservation Camp Program and to live in the 
Conservation Camp. 
15. I agree to remain in the program for a minimum of 1 year. 
LZ££S" 
3ALYN BLACKBURN, DIRECTOR 
35-1-16. Powers and duties of commission — Fees. 
il) It shall be the duty of the commission, and it shall have full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to: 
(a) supervise every employment and place of employment and to ad-
minister and enforce all laws for the protection of the life, health, safety, 
and welfare of employees: 
ib) ascertain and fix reasonable standards, and prescribe, modify, and 
enforce reasonable orders, for the adoption of safety devices, safeguards, 
and other means or methods of protection, to be as nearly uniform as 
possible, as necessary to carry out all laws and lawful orders relative to 
the protection of the life, health, safety, and welfare of employees in 
employment and places of employment; 
i.c> ascertain, fix, and order reasonable standards for the construction, 
repair, and maintenance of places of employment as shall make them 
safe; 
id) investigate, ascertain, and determine reasonable classifications of 
persons, employments, and places of employment as necessary to carry 
out the purposes of this title; 
(e) promote the voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation of 
disputes between employers and employees; 
(f) establish and conduct free employment agencies, and license, super-
vise, and regulate private employment offices, and bring together em-
ployers seeking employees and working people seeking employment, and 
make known the opportunities for employment in this state; 
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(g) collect, collate, and publish statistical and other information relat-
ing to employees, employers, employments, and places of employment and 
such other statistics as it considers proper; and 
(h) ascertain and adopt reasonable standards and regulations, pre-
scribe and enforce reasonable orders, and take such other actions as may 
be appropriate for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of all 
persons with respect to all prospects, tunnels, pits, banks, open cut work-
ings, quarries, strip mine operations, ore mills, and surface operations or 
any other mining operation, whether or not the relationship of employer 
and employee exists, but the commission may not assume jurisdiction or 
authority over adopted standards and regulations or perform any mining 
inspection or enforcement of mining rules and regulations so long as 
Utah's mining operations are governed by federal regulations. 
2) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the commission may adopt a 
schedule of fees assessed for services provided by the commission. The fee 
;hali be reasonable and fair, and shall reflect the cost of services provided. 
z.dch fee established in this manner shall be submitted to and approved by the 
*-*?islature as part of the commission's annual appropriations request. The 
- amission may not charge or collect any fee proposed in this manner without 
•.pcroval by the Legislature. Prior to submitting any proposed fee to the Legis-
.^:ure. the commission shall conduct a public hearing on the proposed fee. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, $ 16; C.i- 1917, i.l>, added "to" at the end of the introductory 
; *076: L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. language, deleted "to" at the beginning of 
•**•!. 42-1-16: L. 1973, ch. S6, $ 1; 1984 (2nd Paragraphs a- through <h> and made a series 
%
 *• . ch. 15, i 4o; 1988, ch. 197, § 1; 1988, of minor stylistic changes throughout Para-
"
n
- 198. $ l. graphs f) and ;h). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 2nd 5.5.» The 1988 amendment, by Laws 1988. Chap-
:
~—.cment added Subsection »2>; and made cer 198. effective April 25, 1988, added the lan-
"*••"• -r changes in phraseology, punctuation, guage beginning with "but the commission" at 
;
" i ,t:**e- c^e enc* °f Subsection «1 <h>. 
"••?J983 amendment, by Laws 1988. Chap- This section is set out as reconciled by the 
"" *-
7
 -iiTective April 25, 1988. added the last Office of Legislative Research and General 
""'•"•"•ce in Subsection '2> and. in Subsection Council. 
dd 
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History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 17, subd. 2; 
C L. 1917, § 3077, subd. 1; L. 1921, ch. 67, | 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-20. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 386. *» 1092. 
35-1-23. Petition for hearing — Contents. 
Such hearing shall be on verified petition filed with the commission, setting 
out specifically and in full detail the order upon which a hearing is desired 
and every reason why such order is unreasonable or unlawful and every issue 
to be considered by the commission on the hearing. The petitioner shall be 
deemed to have waived all objection to any irregularities and illegalities in 
the order upon which a hearing is sought other than those set forth in the 
petition. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 17, subd. 2; 
CX. 1917, } 3077, subd. 2; L. 1921, ch. 67, 
§ 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-21. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C J . S . — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 385. *» 1092. 
35-1-24. Hearing — Procedure. 
Upon receipt of such petition, if the issues presented therein have thereto-
fore been adequately considered, the commission shall determine the same by 
confirming, without hearing, its previous determination, or, if necessary to 
determine the issue presented, the commission shall order a hearing thereon 
and consider and determine the matter at such time as shall be prescribed. 
Notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be given to the petitioner 
and to such other persons as the commission may find directly interested 
therein. If the order complained of is found to be unlawful or unreasonable, 
the commission shall substitute therefor such other order as may be lawful 
and reasonable. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, 3 17, subds. 3, 4; 
C.L. 1917, § 3077, subds. 3,4; L. 1921, ch. 67, 
§ 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-22. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJ .S . — 100 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 385. «=» 1092. 
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do-i-4^ jsimployers enumerated and defined — Regularly 
employed — Statutory employers. 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the state 
are considered employers under this title. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), each person, including each public 
utility and each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more 
workers or operatives in the same business, or in or about the same establish-
ment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written is consid-
ered an employer under this title. As used in this subsection: 
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(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the 
trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether contin-
uous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. 
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged in the perfor-
mance of any work for another who, while so engaged, is independent of 
the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work, is not 
subject to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in the 
performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the 
employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the employer's 
design. 
(3) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered an employer under this 
title if: 
(i) his employees are all members of his immediate family and he 
has a proprietary interest in the farm where they work; or 
(ii) he employed five or fewer persons other than immediate family 
members for 40 hours or more per week per employee for 13 consecu-
tive weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months, 
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee or more 
than one employee at least 40 hours per week is not considered an em-
ployer under this title. 
(4) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic servants who is not 
under this title has the right and option to come under it by complying with 
its provisions and the rules of the commission. 
(5) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done 
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, the contractor, all persons employed by him, all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any of these sub-
contractors, are considered employees of the original employer. 
(b) A general contractor may not be considered to have retained super-
vision or control over the work of a subcontractor solely because of the 
customary trade relationship between general contractors and subcon-
tractors. 
(c) A portion of a construction project subcontracted to others may be 
considered to be a part or process in the trade or business of the general 
building contractor, only if the general building contractor, without re-
gard to whether or not it would need additional employees, would perform 
the work in the normal course of its trade or business. 
(d) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing, 
or remodelling a residence that he owns or is in the process of acquiring 
as his personal residence may not be considered an employee or employer 
solely by operation of Subsection (a). 
(e) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may 
not be considered an employee under Subsection (a) if: 
(i) the person is not included as an employee under Subsection 
35-1-43 (3) (a); or 
(ii) the person is included as an employee under Subsection 
35-1-43 (3) (a), but his employer fails to insure or otherwise provide 
adequate payment of direct compensation, which failure is attribut-
able to an act or omission over which the person had or shared control 
or responsibility. 
awvc Crimea — lvnning lessees and sublessees 
— Partners and sole proprietors — Corporate of-
ficers and directors — Real estate agents and 
brokers. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "employee/' "worker" or "workmen/' and ''oper-
ative" mean: 
(a) each elective and appointive officer and any other person, in the 
service of the state, or of any county, city, town, or school district within 
the state, serving the state, or any county, city, town, or school district 
under any election or appointment, or under any contract of hire, express 
or implied, written or oral, including each officer and employee of the 
state institutions of learning and members of the National Guard while 
on state active duty; and 
(b) each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section 
35-1-42, who employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the 
same business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract 
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors, 
whether legally or illegally working for hire, but not including any per-
son whose employment is casual and not in the usual course of the trade, 
business, or occupation of his employer. 
(2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter, 
any lessee in mines or of mining property and each employee and sublessee of 
the lessee shall be covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter, 
and shall be subject to this chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same 
extent as if they were employees of the lessor drawing such wages as are paid 
employees for substantially similar work. The lessor may deduct from the 
proceeds of ores mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance pre-
mium for that type of work. 
(3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include as an em-
ployee under this chapter any partner of the partnership or the owner of 
the sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes this 
election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon 
the commission naming the persons to be covered. No partner of a part-
nership or owner of a sole proprietorship is considered an employee under 
this chapter until this notice has been given. For premium rate making, 
the insurance carrier shall assume the salary or wage of the employee to 
be 150% of the state's average weekly wage. 
(b) A corporation may elect not to include any director or officer of the 
corporation as an employee under this chapter. If a corporation makes 
this election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and 
upon the commission naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. A 
director or officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this 
chapter until this notice has been given. 
(4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "oper-
ative" do not include a real estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in 
Section 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for a real estate broker 
if: 
(a) substantially all of the real estate agent's or associated broker's 
income for services is from real estate commissions; 
(b) the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are per-
formed under a written contract specifying that the real estate agent is an 
independent contractor; and 
(c) the contract states that the real estate agent or associated broker is 
not to be treated as an employee for federal income tax purposes. 
(5) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "oper-
ative" do not include an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or 
64-13-19, except as required by federal statute or regulation. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 51; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3111; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; 1925, ch. 73, § 1; 
R.S. 1933, 42-1-41; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 
1943, 42-1-41; L. 1943, ch. 48, § 1; 1945, ch. 
65, $ 1; 1949, ch. 52, § 1; 1957, ch. 62, § 1; 
1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1975, ch. 101, § 2; 1984, ch. 
76, § 1; 1985, ch. 75, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 4; 
1988 . e h . 10<J s o. I M O -*- +~~ - ~ -
ment by ch. 106, effective May 3, 1993, added 
Subsection (5). 
The 1993 amendment by ch. 130, effective 
May 3,1993, inserted "and members of the Na-
tional Guard while on state active duty" near 
the end of Subsection (IXa). 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-45 
Injury arising out of or in course of em-
ployment. 
"Act of God" is not by implication excluded 
in Subdivision (5) of this section. State Rd. 
Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 252, 
190 P. 544 (1920). 
Where mine superintendent was killed by 
holdup bandits as he entered store to purchase 
cigar for his own use, his death was not com-
pensable as "accidental" injury within this sec-
tion since in order to recover for accidental in-
jury there must be some causal connection or 
relation between act causing injury and em-
ployment or duties of injured employee. 
Westerdahl v. State Ins. Fund, 60 Utah 325, 
208 P. 494 (1922). 
Where state road employee while working on 
road sought shelter from storm and was struck 
by lightning, the accident arose out of and in 
course of employment. State Rd. Comm'n v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 252, 190 P. 544 
(1920). 
Under Subdivision (5) although an employee 
is employed on the day of an accident, it cannot 
be said he is in the course of his employment 
where he steps aside to engage in an alterca-
tion with some third person concerning a per-
sonal grievance wholly unrelated to matters 
connected with his employment. Wilkerson v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 355, 266 P. 270 
(1928). 
Wife of deceased drugstore employee was not 
entitled to compensation where she did not sus-
tain burden of proving that typhoid fever was 
result of injury received in course of his em-
ployment. Chase v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 
Utah 141, 17 P.2d 205 (1932). 
Death of beer truck driver after being taken 
to the hospital when he had a severe pain in 
his chest after making his second morning de-
livery, did not result from an accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment, 
where substance of opinions of medical panel 
was that death from coronary thrombosis with 
myocardial infarction was not caused from the 
exertion of deceased's work on that morning. 
Burton v. Industrial Comm'n, 13 Utah 2d 353, 
374 P.2d 439 (1962). 
Regular course of employment 
Bricklayer killed in automobile accident 
while returning home from work was not killed 
in an accident arising out of or in the course of 
employment despite fact that decedent's hourly 
wage had been increased due to location of con-
struction site; increased hourly wage did not 
constitute pay for travel time. Barney v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 P.2d 1271 
(1973). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. —- 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 1. 
A.L.R. — Suicide as compensable under 
Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 A.L.R.3d 
616. 
Workmen's compensation: injury or death 
due to storms, 42 A.L.R.3d 385. 
Workmen's compensation: injury sustained 
while attending employer-sponsored social af-
fair as arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment, 47 A.L.R.3d 566. 
Master and servant: employer's liability for 
injury caused by food or drink purchased by 
employee in plant facilities, 50 A.L.R.3d 505. 
Workers' compensation law as precluding 
employee's suit against employer for third per-
son's criminal attack, 49 A.L.R.4th 926. 
Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as 
compensable, 52 A.L.R.4th 731. 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
** 47. 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the depen-
dents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospi-
tal services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur-
ance carrier and not on the employee. 
157 
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63-46b-16, Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, i*^  unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and sub-
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, 5 26. stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "As cedure" in Subsections (2Xa) and (2)(b). 
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Court of Appeals" for 'The Supreme Court or § 3^5
 makes the act effective on January 1, 
other appellate court designated by 3tatuten in ^933 
Subsection U); inserted "with the appropriate 
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64-13-6 STATE INSTITUTIONS 
(4) The director of the department shall provide staff assistance and any 
information necessary for the Corrections Advisory Council to fulfill its re-
sponsibilities under this chapter. 
History. C. 1953, 64-13-5, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1977, cb. 253, § 5, creating 
1985, ch. 198, S 5. division of corrections, and enacts the above 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, section, 
ch. 198, § 5 repeals former § 64-13-5, as 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 72 CJ.S. Prisons § 5. 
Key Numbers. — Prisons «=» 4. 
64-13-6. Purpose of department. 
The primary purpose of the Department of Corrections includes the follow-
ing: 
(1) protection of the public through institutional care and confinement, 
and supervision in the community where appropriate; 
(2) implementation of court-ordered punishment of the criminal of-
fender for the purpose of maintaining a law-abiding and productive soci-
ety; 
(3) provision of rehabilitation opportunities to assist the criminal of-
fender in functioning as a law-abiding and productive member of society; 
(4) individualized treatment of the offender; and 
(5) management of programs to take into account the needs and inter-
ests of victims where reasonable. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-6, enacted by L. ch. 211, § 1 repeals former § 64-13-6 as 
1985, ch- 211, § 1. amended by Laws 1979, ch. 102, § 16, relating 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, to appointment of director, and enacts the 
ch. 198, S 9 repeals § 64-13-6, and Laws 1985, above section. 
64-13-7. Offenders in custody of department. 
All offenders committed for incarceration in a state prison facility, for su-
pervision on probation or parole, or for evaluation, shall be placed in the 
custody of the department. The department shall establish procedures and is 
responsible for the appropriate assignment or transfer of public offenders to 
facilities or programs. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-7, enacted by L. administration of state prison, and enacts the 
1985, ch. 211, § 2. above section. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1985, Cross-References. — Pardons and paroles, 
ch. 211, § 2 repeals former § 64-13-7, as Chapter 27 of Title 77. 
enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 7, relating to 
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64-13-16. Inmate employment, 
(1) Unless incapable of employment because of sickness or other infirmity 
or for security reasons, the department may employ inmates to the degree 
that funding and available resources allow. An offender may not be employed 
on work which benefits any employee or officer of the department. 
(2) An offender employed under this section is not considered an employee, 
worker, workman, or operative for purposes of Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' 
Compensation, except as required by federal statute or regulation. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-16, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 11; 1987, ch. 116, § 11; 1993, 
ch. 106, § 3. 
Amendment Notes, — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "the department may employ 
inmates to the degree that funding and avail-
able resources allow" for "inmates shall be em-
ployed on a regular basis, as is practicable" at 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-19, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 211, § 14: 1987, ch. 116, § 13; 1993, 
ch. 106. § 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "correctional facilities" for 
"the prisons" at the end of the first sentence 
the end of the first sentence, substituted "An 
offender may not" for "No inmate may" at the 
beginning of the second sentence, and deleted 
the former third, fourth, and last sentences. 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993, 
added the (1) designation and added Subsec-
tion (2). 
and "offenders'* for "inmates" in the second and 
third sentences, and inserted "sale to" in the 
third sentence. 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3. 1993, 
added the (1) designation and added Subsec-
tion <2». 
64-13-19. Labor at correctional facilities. 
(1) The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and 
what kind, quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be 
produced, manufactured, or repaired at correctional facilities. Contracts may 
be made for the labor of offenders, including contracts with any federal agency 
for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as practicable may 
be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or sup-
plies for sale to the state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods, 
materials, and supplies shall be fixed by the department. 
(2) An offender performing labor under this section is not considered an 
employee, worker, workman, or operative for purposes of Title 35, Chapter 1, 
Workers' Compensation, except as required by federal statute or regulation. 
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June 18, 1979 
Mr, Gary L. Webster 
Deputy Director 
Division of Corrections 
Department of Social Services 
150 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Re: Employee Status of 
Inmates 
at the Utah State Prison, 
No, 79-90 
Dear Mr. Webster: 
In your letter of March 13, 1979, you asked whether 
an inmate at the Utah State Prison employed in the Prison 
Industries Program is defined as a state employee. My research 
indicates that the answer to your question is no, based on the 
following analysis* 
If inmates of the Utah State Prison who work in the 
Prison Industries Program are defined as employees of the State 
of Utah while they perform such work, suck inmates may be 
entitled to claim Workmen's Compensation benefits for injuries 
suffered in the course of their employment* In addition, the 
State would be required to comply with reporting requirements 
imposed upon employers by the Industrial Commission, in rela-
tion to inmates as employees* 
In order for a laborer in Utah to qualify as a poten-
tial claimant for Workmen's Compensation benefits, he must 
fall within the definition of "employee" found in Utah Code 
Ann* 35-1-43 (1963), as amended (all statutory references are 
to the Utah Code Annotated unless otherwise specified). That 
section provides: 
Mr. Gary L. Wester 
June 18, 1979 
Page 2 
The words ,femployee," "workmen" and 
"operative," as used in this title, shall 
be construed to mean: 
(1) Every elective and appointive 
1 
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officer, and every other person, in the 
service of the state • . . under any 
election or appointment, or under any 
contract of hire, express or implied, 
written or oral. . . • (emphasis added). 
Since inmates of the prison working in the Prison Industries 
Program are neither elected nor appointed, in order for such 
inmates to qualify as "employees" as above defined, they 
must be serving the state under an express or implied "contract 
of hire." 
Although there have been no cases decided in Utah 
dealing with the question of the status of inmates as state 
employees, several other state courts have dealt with the 
question and a general rule has emerged from such opinions. 
This general rule is stated in 1A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
LAW, 47.31 at p. 795: 
Convicts and prisoners have usually been 
denied compensation for injuries sustained 
in connection with work done within the prison, 
even when some kind of reward attended their 
exertions. The reason given is that such a 
convict cannot and does not make a true contract 
of hire with the authorities by whom he is 
confined. The inducements which might be held 
out to him, in the form of extra food or even 
money, are in no sense consideration for an 
enforceable contract of hire. 
Only three states have recognized a limited right 
of prisoners to receive workmen's compensation benefits, and 
in those states such rights are expressly prescribed by statute. 
In Wisconsin, the state legislature provided that prisoners 
injured while incarcerated in a state institution may receive 
benefits only upon parole or final discharge, ". . • as if the 
Mr. Gary L. Webster 
June 18, 1979 
Page 3 
injury had been covered by the worker's compensation act 
. . . ." wis, Stat- 56.21 (1975). A Maryland statute 
provides that prisoners may receive benefits when injured 
while working for a county government; Md. Ann. Code, Art. 
101 35 (1957)• The North Carolina legislature, while 
recognizing that inmates generally cannot qualify for 
2 
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benefits, has carved out a limited exception in which if 
death occurs or if the results of the injury continue after 
discharge, the inmate or his representatives may apply for 
benefits; N.C. Gen. Stat. 97.13(c) (1969). No provisions 
similar to these may be found in the Utah Code. 
The courts of at least twelve states have addressed 
the issue of inmate status and each court has determined that 
inmates working on prison projects do not qualify as state 
or county employees because they are not employed under a 
"contract of hire.'fl) 
Representative of the case law on the subject is 
Frederick v. Men's Reformatory, 203 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 1973), 
in which the Supreme Court of Iowa denied an award of workmen's 
compensation benefits to an inmate who was injured while working 
in the prison license plate factory• The court looked to the 
Iowa statute# which required a "contract of service* in order 
for a person to qualify as an employee for the purpose of the 
workman's compensation act. Emphasis was places on the volun-
tariness of the relationship between the alleged employer and 
employee. The court stated at page 798s 
The relationship between the state and 
its prisoners is the antithesis of voluntary 
employment. All imprisonment is at hard 
labor. . . The state does not employ prisoners 
at will, is not obligated to pay wages to 
them, and obviously does not intend an employer-
employee relationship. Likewise, prisoners do 
not enter the reformatory to find work* 
(1) The states which have addressed the issue include: Iowa, 
Idaho, Georgia, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, 
Louisiana, New York, Indiana, New Jersey, and Arizona. 
Mr. Gary L. Webster 
June 18, 1979 
Page 4 
The court held that since the relationship was not voluntary, 
and the compensation of eight cents per hour was paid only 
to induce cooperation and not as compensation, inmates did 
not qualify as employees of the state. [See also Tackett v. 
Lagrange Penitentiary, Ky., 524 S.W.2d 468 (1975)*] 
3 
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In Abrams v. Madison County Highway Department, 
495 S.W.2d 539 (Tenn. 1973)# the Tennessee Supreme Court 
emphasized the lack of voluntariness in affirming the denial 
of an inmate's application for workman's compensation benefits* 
The court stressed that where inmates are required by law to 
work, and where sanctions such as solitary confinement may be 
imposed for failure to work, inmates do not have the ability 
to enter into a "contract of hire." In Held v. New York State 
Department of Correctional Services, 387 N,Y.S.2d 589 (I976)f 
the appellate division of the New York Supreme Court held that 
an inmate did not qualify as an employee of the stage while 
working within the prison even though inmates were free to 
refuse work. The only alternative/ 24 hour confinement in 
their cells, was not looked upon as a true alternative by the 
court• 
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized in Shain v. Idaho 
State Penitentiary, 291 P.2d 870 (Ida, 1955), that nominal 
compensation, privileges, and favorable consideration upon 
parole hearings were not sufficient considerations to give 
rise to a contract of hire in an employer-employee relation-
ship between inmates and the state. Finally, in two well 
reasoned opinions, the Arizona courts formulated a test to 
be applied in determining the employment status of inmates. 
In Watson v. Industrial Commission, 100 Ariz, 327, 414 P.2d 
144 (1966)/ the court stated that in order for there to be 
a "contract of hire" between inmates working on prison 
projects 
there must be: (1) a voluntary relationship of employment, 
(2) consideration flowing from the State to the inmates, and 
(3) at least two parties capable of consenting to the relation-
ship. In this case, a prisoner was injured while working on a 
prison farm and his application for benefits was denied• The 
court reasoned that since the inmates were required to work 
and were disciplined for their failure to do so, no "contract 
of hire" could exist between them and the state• The Watson 
case was relied upon in Keenev v. Industrial Commission, 24 
Ari2.App. 3, 535 P.2d 31 (1975), wherein the court affirmed 
the denial of a claim for benefits based upon an injury 
Mr. Gary L. Webster 
June 18, 1979 
Page 5 
suffered by an inmate while working in the prison license 
plate plant. Although the inmate was receiving compensation 
in the form of two days' credit for every one day worked as 
well as 25 cents per hour, there could be no "contract of 
4 
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hire" where such work was not voluntarily entered into. 
Utah Code Ann, 77-36-7 (1953), as amended, provides: 
In all cases when by law a person is sentenced 
to imprisonment, either in the state prison or in 
a county jail, it shall be at hard labor, whether 
so designated by the court or jury or not. 
Further, Utah Code Ann. 64-13-14 (1953), as amended, provides: 
Unless incapable of employment because of 
sickness or other infirmity or for security 
reasons, inmates shall be kept employed except 
on Sundays, other days of worship and holidays 
as far as practical. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. 64-13-25 (1953), as amended, gives the Director 
of the Division of Corrections broad discretion in determining 
what lines of labor will be pursued in the Prison Industries 
Program- Thus# inmates of the Utah State Prison are required 
to work, and sanctions may be used for their failure to do so. 
Inmates are paid only a nominal compensation, insufficient to 
constitute consideration to support a contract of hire* 
Applying the three-part test of the Watson case, supra, 
to the Prison Industries Program in Utah, the situation fails to 
meet each of the criteria* First, since prisoners are required 
by statute to work and since the Division of Corrections is 
mandated by statute to provide employment for them, the relation-
ship between the state and the prisoners is f,the antithesis of 
voluntary employment." Frederick, supra. Second, because the 
inmates receive no extra credit applied to their sentences for 
working, and because the nominal amount of money paid to them 
is not paid as wages but only to induce compliance with the 
work program, such compensation is not sufficient "consideration» 
flowing from the state to inmates to support a "contract of 
hire." 
Finally, because of the statutory requirement that prisoners 
must work, they are not able to choose not to work without 
suffering disciplinary sanction. Inmates are not capable of 
consenting to the contractual relationship of employer-employee 
with the State of Utah. 
Mr. Gary L. Webster 
June 18, 1979 
Page 6 
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Inmates who work in the Prison Industries Program 
at the Utah State Prison do not qualify as employees of the 
State of Utah for the purpose of receiving workmen's 
Compensation benefits* This is because they so not serve 
the State under any express or implied "contract of hire," 
as required by Utah Code Ann. 35-1-43 (1953), as amended. 
Very truly yours, 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CLB/sh 
In order to computerize the Attorney General opinions. the 
original documents were either processed through a scanner andfor 
re-tvoed. During such process, impressions of signatures and 
letterhead printing could not be copied. 
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